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Abstract—A proposal for an autonomous and flexible ship con-3
tainer inspection system is presented. This could be accomplished4
by the incorporation of an inspection system on various container5
transportation devices (straddle carriers, yard gentry cranes,6
automated guided vehicles, trailers). The configuration is termi-7
nal specific and it should be defined by the container terminal8
operator. This enables that no part of the port operational area9
is used for inspection. The inspection scenario includes container10
transfer from ship to transportation device with the inspection11
unit mounted on it. The inspection is performed during actual12
container movement to the container location. A neutron gen-13
erator without associated alpha particle detection is used. This14
allows the use of higher neutron intensities (5× 109 − 1010 n/s15
in 4π). The inspected container is stationary in the “inspection16
position” on the transportation device while the “inspection unit”17
moves along its side. The following analytical methods will be used18
simultaneously: neutron radiography, X-ray radiography, neutron19
activation analysis, (n, γ) and (n,n’γ) reactions, neutron absorp-20
tion. and scattering, X-ray backscattering. The neutron techniques21
will utilize “smart collimators” for neutrons and gamma rays, both22
emitted and detected. The inspected voxel is defined by the inter-23
section of the neutron generator and the detectors solid angles. The24
container inspection protocol is based on identification of discrep-25
ancies between the cargo manifest, elemental “fingerprint” and26
radiography profiles. In addition, the information on container27
weight is obtained during the container transport and screening28
by measuring of density of material in the container.29
Index Terms—Activation analysis, container inspection, gamma30
ray spectra, neutron absorption, neutron scattering, neutrons,31
radiography, x-ray backscattering.32
I. INTRODUCTION33
W HITHIN the framework of two EU projects34 (EURITRACK and ERITR@C) and one NATO35
project (SfP-980526), a technology of container inspection36
with a new neutron probe used as a secondary sensor has been37
developed for detailed inspection of the suspected container38
volume as determined by an X-ray system. A demonstration39
facility was constructed and mounted at the container terminal40
Brajdica, Port of Rijeka, Croatia. Some 150 containers have41
been inspected in combination with the Smith Heimann42
300 unit.43
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Following the implementation of the above mentioned 44
projects, several disadvantages and imperfections of using 45
tagged neutrons have been identified. 46
i) EURITRACK-like system requires a site area of ∼500m2 47
container terminal storage area. Loss of income to the 48
Container terminal and Port of Rijeka during the imple- 49
mentation of EURITRACK and ERITR@C projects was 50
estimated to 48,000 /year. 51
ii) No functional sensor (Smiths Heimann-Tagged neutron 52
system) communication has been established. 53
iii) The neutron beam intensity has been limited to ∼107 n/s 54
in 4π requiring irradiations of suspected area/spot/voxel 55
for 10 minutes since only a fraction of the neutron gen- 56
erator output was used with detection of associated alpha 57
particles. 58
iv) Only small percentage of port leaving containers could be 59
screened. 60
v) Questionable determination of the difficult to measure 61
nitrogen signature and subsequent construction of C-N-O 62
diagrams. 63
All mentioned disadvantages could be avoided by design, 64
construction and building of an autonomous and flexible 65
inspection system: Autonomous Ship Container Inspector 66
System (ASCIS). 67
This could be accomplished by: 68
1. The incorporation of the inspection system on the con- 69
tainer transportation devices (straddle carriers, yard gen- 70
try cranes automated guided vehicles, trailers–to be 71
decided by container terminal operator). In this way, no 72
part of the port operational area was used for inspection. 73
The inspection scenario included container transfer from 74
ship to transportation device with inspection unit mounted 75
on it, and inspection during container movement to the 76
container location (either to exit truck or terminal yard 77
position). 78
2. Use of neutron generator without associated alpha particle 79
detection. The area analyzed was determined by mount- 80
ing the neutron generator inside shielding and collimator, 81
defining a narrow fan beam of neutrons. This allows 82
the use of higher neutron intensities (5× 109 − 1010 n/s 83
in 4π). 84
3. The inspected container was stationary in the “inspec- 85
tion position” on the transportation device while the 86
“inspection unit” was moving along side with a speed of 87
12 m/min, resulting in ∼1 min inspection time, Ti, for 88
the whole container (2 TEU). The efforts were directed 89
towards reduction of Ti to as low as possible value. A 90
detached part of the “inspection unit” was mounted on the 91
gentry crane spreader to detect radionuclides and SNM 92
using fast neutron bombardment and detection of induced 93
gamma and neutron radiation. 94
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4. It is proposed to design, construct and build a trailer95
inspection unit using the following analytical methods96
simultaneously: neutron radiography, X-ray radiography,97
neutron activation analysis, (n, γ) and (n,n’γ) reac-98
tions, neutron absorption, neutron backscattering, X-ray99
backscattering. Neutron based techniques take advantage100
of using “smart collimators” for neutrons, both emitted101
and detected. The inspected voxel was defined by the102
intersections of the neutron generator and detector solid103
angles.104
In addition, the information on container weight was105
obtained during the container transport and foreseen screening.106
One of the essential parameter to be measured is the density107
of material in the container. Based on this measurement one108
should be able to evaluate the “average container density” and109
calculate its weight.110
II. CONCEPT AND APPROACH111
Radioactivity Measurements112
Presently, there are several commercially available radiation113
detection unit mounted on the gantry crane which can detect114
eventual presence of radioactive materials inside the transported115
container by, so called, passive measurement [1]. VeriTainer’s116
container crane mounted radiation detection and identification117
system, called the VeriSpreader, employs an advanced passive118
scanning technology (3He neutron counter and NaI(Tl) γ spec-119
trometer) and sophisticated identification algorithms to detect120
and identify gamma and neutron sources in shipping contain-121
ers as they are loaded or discharged from a container ship.122
VeriTainer’s prototype crane mounted solution (CMS) was in123
continuous operation at the Port of Oakland from April 2, 2007124
through May, 2008 (13 months). It operated without mechan-125
ical failure or loss of sensitivity over the course of more than126
47,000 container moves.127
The detached component of the proposed inspection unit128
can be used as an additional screening unit providing a neu-129
tron source which might induce radioactivity especially on130
fissile materials and SNMs (U, Th and others), see Fig. 1. A131
potential candidate for the neutron generator is the so called132
“long neutron generator”.133
The proposed system will consist of a spreader bar for the134
container crane assembly, neutron generator, γ-radiation and135
neutron detectors and a computer capable of wireless (cloud)136
communication. The system will measure and analyze gamma-137
ray counts and energy spectra as well as neutron counts from138
the detectors in real time as the containers are loaded to, or139
unloaded from, the container ships. The primary purpose is to140
detect the presence of radioactivity especially of fissile materi-141
als and SNMs (U, Th and others) and alert the user of elevated142
gamma and neutron rates.143
Inspection Unit144
We assume that only a hybrid gamma ray / neutron system145
based not only on a typical fast neutron gamma radiography146
system will offer better detection capabilities. In the design of147
Fig. 1. Proposed inspection unit to be mounted on quay crane. F1:1
Fig. 2. Schematic presentation of U-shaped inspection unit; density determina-
tion by using neutron transmission measurement.
F2:1
F2:2
Fig. 3. U-shaped inspection unit slides on rails along side the inspected
container.
F3:1
F3:2
the inspection unit we considered incorporating the following 148
analytical methods to be used simultaneously. 149
• neutron radiography, 150
• gamma ray radiography, 151
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• neutron activation analysis, (n, γ) and (n,n’γ) reactions,152
• neutron scattering and absorption.153
The last two techniques will take the advantage of using “BM154
smart collimators” for neutrons, both emitted and detected.155
There are several proposed radiography systems [2], [3]. The156
new system will be based on the AC6015XN air cargo scanner157
which has developed by CSIRO and Nuctech [4], because this158
is the most promising device. Comparison of the neutron and159
gamma-ray transmissions yields an R-value that can be used160
to discriminate between a wide range of organic and inorganic161
materials. However, although the fact that the AC6015XN is162
a triple beam device and there are 3 R-values the Australian163
scientists use only 2 R values. The third R value could offer164
extra and sometimes valuable information [5].165
Attention was focused to the selection of the X-ray sources.166
We shall investigate which combination of the X-ray beams is167
the best among the typical energies 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 or 9 MeV168
electron LINAC (linear accelerator), or some other values.169
Smaller detectors, especially for the X-ray array will offer170
better inspection capabilities (5× 5 mm CsI detectors–to be171
investigated). Also with smaller neutron detectors (e.g. 10×172
10 mm plastic detectors) we will “see” more details on the neu-173
tron radiography mode which represents a significant enhance-174
ment compared to the 20× 20 mm detectors used today.175
Regarding the neutron source, the only solution was the176
DT neutron generator because 14 MeV neutrons have relevant177
acceptable penetration capabilities. However, typical generators178
with a solid state targets have a short life times (typical 500-179
2000 hours), which makes associated alpha particle method180
inappropriate. Therefore, one should use the DT neutron gen-181
erators using a plasma source. This provides for at least 25,000182
hour of operational life.183
The inspection unit is “U” shaped construction with three184
arms: right, bottom and left.185
Left arm contains radiation units: neutron generator and186
X-ray source (6 MeV LINAC) inside shielding box, both having187
“smart collimators” in order to produce collimated beams.188
Bottom arm will contained the battery of gamma detectors189
(5′′ × 5′′ NaI or BGO, number, size and type to be determined).190
From our previous measurements [6] it is known that for the191
detection of 100 kg of explosive in iron matrix of density192
0.2 g/cm3, 54485 s were needed with a neutron beam intensity193
of 107 n/s and by using two 3× 3 NaI(Tl) gamma ray detectors194
inside a lead shielding thickness 5 cm. With the neutron beam195
intensity increased for three orders of magnitude this measuring196
time could be reduced to 54 s. By using a battery of thirteen 5”197
NaI detectors this could be reduced to some 3 s. This is only the198
rule of thumb estimate, the complete system performances will199
be assessed in the course of a future project.200
Right arm contains the neutron detector array for neutron201
radiography containing probably some 700 neutron plastic202
detectors dimensions 20× 20× 75 mm (to be determined);203
X-ray detector array of 10× 10× 50 mm CsI(Tl) detectors204
(exact size, number and type to be determined). Both arrays205
will be stationary with respect to radiation sources and mounted206
inside appropriate shielding. This arm also has a beam trans-207
mission detector equipped with a smart collimator and n-γ208
Fig. 4. Components of “U” shaped inspector: collimated radiation sources
(neutrons and X-rays), collimated gamma-ray detectors (bottom), collimated
neutron transmission detector, neutron and X-ray detector’s arrays.
F4:1
F4:2
F4:3
separation circuit. The detector is at a fixed position with 209
respect to neutron source at all times. 210
The size of the inspected voxel is defined by “smart col- 211
limators” in f ont of the detectors and neutron source. The 212
construction of collimators will be based on the MNCP cal- 213
culations and experiences of previous efforts as described in 214
ref [7], [8]. With two gamma ray batteries in the bottom arm, 215
24 positions of inspection unit would be required to cover a 40” 216
container length. If in addition 3 vertical positions are included, 217
this will result in 3× 24 = 72 scans, each lasting 3 s. It fol- 218
lows that the complete inspection can be done in 3–5 minutes. 219
It should be mentioned that this estimation is valid for the 220
detection of 100 kg of explosives (and other threat materials) 221
in an iron matrix with a density of 0.2 g/cm3 or an organic 222
matrix of density 0.1 g/cm3. Results for containers inspected 223
in the Port of Rijeka, Croatia, indicated that the average con- 224
tainer density was around 0.1 g/cm3, with organic type cargo 225
represented by 62%, metallic with 15%. It follows that for con- 226
tainers with higher density cargo, the measurement time could 227
be longer, which could be decided from the first evaluation of 228
the container average density. 229
During the project implementation, considerations were 230
made on the three variants of Inspection units: “U”, “L” and “I” 231
shaped, see Fig. 4, 8 and 9, respectively. We first start with “U” 232
shaped Inspection unit because it can be realized with the appli- 233
cations of present day knowledge. In this case the Inspection 234
unit is U-shaped so that the container can be brought inside 235
it. The inspected container was stationary in the “gantry crane 236
inspection position” while the “inspection unit” was moving 237
along side with a speed of 1-2–m/min, resulting in ∼10 min 238
inspection times for the whole container. 239
The chemical elements present in the investigated voxel were 240
determined by measuring resulting gamma spectra by the 3 241
arrays, each containing 12 bottom placed gamma detectors 242
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Fig. 5. “Inspector” mounted on the transport track.F5:1
Fig. 6. Loading the container onto truck mounted inspection unit.F6:1
Fig. 7. On the way to the yard or any other transfer point.F7:1
inside shielding and equipped with “smart collimators” for C,243
O (+ other elements) relative concentration determination.244
Other parameters of components used are:245
• Neutron beam intensity (5× 109 − 1010 n/s in 4π) colli-246
mated using “smart collimators”.247
• Neutron detector (transmission detector) collimated using248
“smart collimator”.249
• Gamma source collimated–bremstrahlung source: 6 MeV250
LINAC (to be decided).251
• Two source positions: bottom and top of the container or252
continuous up-down movement.253
• Construction of C-O-rho(density) triangle diagrams for254
material identification, shown in Fig. 11 and 12.255
Fig. 8. Components of “L” shaped inspector: collimated radiation sources
(neutrons and x-rays), collimated gamma ray detectors (bottom), collimated
neutron transmission detector, neutron and x-ray detector’s arrays.
F8:1
F8:2
F8:3
Fig. 9. Components of “I” shaped inspector: collimated radiation sources
(neutrons and x-rays), collimated gamma ray detectors, collimated neutron
transmission detector, neutron and x-ray detector’s arrays.
F9:1
F9:2
F9:3
• Sum triangle graph will be compared with individual γ- 256
detector triangle graphs in data analysis process and cross 257
checked with radiographs. 258
Until now, cargoes have been shipped based on declared con- 259
tainer weights in booking information provided by shippers. 260
Vessel storage plans and port operations are typically based on 261
these pre-declared weights which can vary significantly from 262
the actual mass of the cargo transported. The consequent risk 263
to health and safety of seafarers and port operatives is clearly 264
apparent [9]. Weighbridges located at the port gate are easy 265
to implement, but present significant challenges in establish- 266
ing the true tare weight of the vehicle and in differentiating 267
the weights of multiple container loads. Within the port, reach 268
stackers and fork-lift trucks provide a relatively low cost path 269
for indirect weight measurement to be integrated into vehicle 270
systems e.g. inferred from hydraulic pressure. However, this is 271
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Fig. 10. 100 kg of Semtex1 explosive in an iron box 40× 40× 66 cm3 in
volume (up) and 64.4 kg of paper in the same box (down).
F10:1
F10:2
likely to be of lower accuracy than direct measurement systems272
and it is questionable whether it would deliver full compli-273
ance with any genuinely robust regulation. Rubber-tired gantry274
cranes and straddle carriers provide a good opportunity for275
the implementation of direct weight measurement of individual276
containers with in the port environment but before final vessel277
loading operations. Such systems may offer a highly flexible278
solution with minimal disruption to existing port operations and279
container logistics.280
The proposed Inspection unit will support one of the key281
recommendations, for the implementation of container weight282
verification technology, that container weight should be mea-283
sured as close as possible to the point of lifting. In addition284
to enabling the verification of individual container weights, the285
proposed Inspection unit will also enable automatic estimation286
of centre of gravity; something that will be extremely useful in287
improving the safety of stacking operations.288
III. EXPERIENCE IN NEUTRON INSPECTION OF289
CONTAINERS290
There are several different approaches in the use of fast neu-291
trons for container cargo inspection. In addition to the use of292
Fig. 11. Triangle diagram for various materials inside the empty container
together with the paper and explosive semtex1a in iron matrix and paper behind
the iron shield.
F11:1
F11:2
F11:3
continuous tagged neutron beam also pulsed neutron beam is 293
used [10]. Also, the use of triangle graphs for threat material 294
detection and identification has been extensively discussed by 295
Maglich and coworkers [11]–[13]. 296
Let us present some of our experience of using C-O-ρ trian- 297
gle graphs in identification of materials hidden inside container 298
[14], [15]. The 14 MeV tagged neutron technique has been 299
used to confirm the presence of the explosive Semtex#1a within 300
the inspected container. Two 3′′ × 3′′ NaI(Tl) were put at the 301
transmission position in the cone of the tagged neutrons beam. 302
Each detector was shielded with a 5 cm thick lead brick [14]. 303
Container around the target was filled with iron boxes of density 304
0.2 g/cm3. 305
We have also illustrated that various threat materials (includ- 306
ing explosives) could be detected inside the container by mea- 307
surement of three variables, C and O concentrations and the 308
density of the investigated material [16]. Carbon and oxygen 309
were detected, but not nitrogen. It can be shown that 100 kg 310
of Semtex#1a can be detected in an iron matrix of density 311
0.2 g/cm3 by using the triangle graph like in Fig. 11. 312
The presence of an iron matrix around the target does not 313
change the position of the material inside the triangle plot. It is, 314
however, well known that an organic matrix would have a big 315
influence on the neutron beam because of attenuation as well 316
as termalization of fast neutrons. In order to demonstrate the 317
usefulness of the neutron system, it was necessary to investigate 318
if and how organic matrix changes the position of the signal of 319
target material inside the triangle diagram. 320
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Fig. 12. Triangle diagram for the transmission detectors (taken from ref. 15).F12:1
The organic cargo was simulated with wooden plates (dry321
wood has formula C22H31O12). Block made from wooden322
plates of 0.53 g/cm3 density and thickness of about 27 cm323
was put in front of the target material in the first measurement324
and close to the container wall in the second measurements.325
The total thickness of this block was about 60 cm along the326
tagged neutron beam axis, which means that the effective den-327
sity is about 0.25 g/cm3 (because of the empty space between328
the wooden plates). However, the average density along the329
container was even less, around 0.1 g/cm3.330
Some of the experimental results are shown in the triangu-331
lar diagram of Fig. 12, where the measured points are located332
in the three regions. The first region corresponds to the paper333
points. The second region corresponds to the semtex1a explo-334
sive and the third region belongs to the flour. Division is not335
rigid. Some overlap exists especially between semtex1a and336
flour. Generally, the effect of the wood plates is to lower down337
the position of the material in the diagram. It could be seen that338
the wooden plates which are far from the target (Case 2) have339
less influence on the target material position in the diagram than340
the wooden plates which are close to the target (Case 1 and Case341
3). Even in the case where some overlap between the regions342
could be expected, the identification of the paper, semtex1a and343
flour is possible provided that the error on estimating the sur-344
rounding organic matrix density is not too large. By knowing345
Fig. 13. Triangle diagram for the transmission detectors (taken from ref. [17]). F13:1
the matrix density and applying the appropriate calibration, it 346
could be determined how much the position of the target inside 347
the diagram is lowered down in comparison with the target case 348
alone. 349
Axes in the figure are defined as: 350
Ro∗ =
(
n′
n¯′
)2
(
n′
n¯′
)2
+
(
C
C¯
)2
+
(
O
O¯
)2 ,
C∗ =
(
C
C¯
)2
(
n′
n¯′
)2
+
(
C
C¯
)2
+
(
O
O¯
)2 ,
O∗ =
(
O
O¯
)2
(
n′
n¯′
)2
+
(
C
C¯
)2
+
(
O
O¯
)2
where n’ is the number of counts in the tagged neutron peak, C 351
is the number of counts in the 4.44 MeV carbon peak, O is the 352
number of counts in the 6.13 MeV oxygen peak and n¯′, C¯, O¯ 353
are average values. 354
Similar measurements were done during the Eritr@ck project 355
with the EURITRACK system which was installed in the con- 356
tainer terminal Brajdica, sea port Rijeka [17]. In that case RDX 357
simulant was successfully detected, but also some drugs like 358
cocaine, heroin and marihuana by using the triangle diagram, 359
see Fig. 13. 360
IV. RADIATION SAFETY 361
One important aspect of the neutron inspection portal to 362
be clarified concerns the possible effects of irradiation on the 363
goods inside the inspected container. Particular attention must 364
be devoted to irradiation of foodstuff, but also pharmaceuticals 365
and medical devices. 366
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The possible effect on the public health of irradiation with367
ionizing radiations of transported goods is twofold. The first368
effect concerns possible modifications of the properties of the369
irradiated materials, induced by the ionizing radiation. This370
problem is particularly relevant for foodstuff, the nutritional and371
organoleptic properties of which must not be altered or modi-372
fied by any treatment. The second effect is connected to the373
possibility that the ionizing radiation might induce activation374
of nuclides of the irradiated products. This problem could be375
particularly relevant when the irradiation system makes use of376
neutrons, since it is unavoidable that some nuclei are converted377
to radioactive nuclides. This fact is particularly significant when378
the irradiated goods are foodstuff, pharmaceuticals or medical379
devices. Indeed, these particular type of goods when ingested,380
or kept in close proximity of the consumer, may deliver a dose381
to the individual [18].382
In considering possible alteration of foodstuff nutritional383
and organoleptic properties, the following is of importance.384
For what concerns irradiation of foodstuff with X-ray for385
food preservation, the Directive 1999/2/EC of the European386
Parliament and of the Council of 22 February 1999 on the387
approximation of the laws of the Member States concern-388
ing foods and food ingredients treated with ionizing radi-389
ation, constitutes the reference norm in Europe, framework390
Directive (Official Journal of the European Communities, L 66391
of 13.3.1999).392
As previously mentioned, this Directive defines its own limits393
of application and shall not apply to: foodstuffs exposed to ion-394
izing radiation generated by measuring or inspection devices,395
provided that the dose absorbed is not greater than 0.01 Gy, for396
inspection devices which utilize neutrons, and 0.5 Gy in other397
cases, at a maximum radiation energy level of 10 MeV in the398
case of X rays, 14 MeV in the case of neutrons and 5 MeV in399
other cases. Member States shall take all measures necessary400
to ensure that irradiated foodstuffs can be placed on the market401
only if they comply with the provisions of this Directive.402
Therefore, irradiation with neutron beams of 14.1 MeV403
which cause an absorbed dose of less than 0.01 Gy can be404
considered safe for preservation of nutritional and organoleptic405
properties of foodstuff. Monte Carlo calculation using a mod-406
eling of particular installations by MCNP5 transport code [19],407
allows estimating the dose absorbed by different kinds of food408
and foodstuff in typical irradiation conditions.409
V. CONCLUSION410
The efforts in the implementation of this project proposal411
will result in an autonomous container inspector system which412
will allow high percentage inspection without interrupting con-413
tainer movement in the container terminal. The inspection will414
be effective in identifying the containers trying to smuggle415
humans, animals, explosive, drugs, miss-declared hazardous416
materials and other contraband items. The inspection proce-417
dure will not require any additional container terminal space418
and will be programmed together with other container terminal419
activities.420
Container screening by novel methods should not be priv-421
ilege of biggest EU sea-ports. The deployment of proposed422
technology, especially in small and medium size sea and river 423
ports in Eastern and Southern parts of EU will protect whole 424
EU from unexpected terrorist events, reduce the illegal traffic in 425
humans, pets and animals, drugs and threat materials including 426
radioactive elements and SNM. 427
The ports on inland European waterways should not be 428
neglected in the EU port security network. If neglected, they 429
will represent an ideal entry point to the pathways through the 430
heart of EU and endanger many EU cities and large number of 431
citizens. 432
Further development of the proposed system, especially in 433
the variant “I” (see Fig. 9), when neutron/X-ray excitation 434
and backscattering are used in one-side geometry, will yield 435
to potential on-board applications. Such a need has been doc- 436
umented in several cases when intelligence sources indicated 437
the ships carrying explosives in on-board containers. Any type 438
of container examination on land is useless in this case if the 439
intention is to explode the ship when in port. 440
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Container Inspection Utilizing 14 MeV Neutrons1
Vladivoj Valkovic, Davorin Sudac, Karlo Nad, and Jasmina Obhodas2
Abstract—A proposal for an autonomous and flexible ship con-3
tainer inspection system is presented. This could be accomplished4
by the incorporation of an inspection system on various container5
transportation devices (straddle carriers, yard gentry cranes,6
automated guided vehicles, trailers). The configuration is termi-7
nal specific and it should be defined by the container terminal8
operator. This enables that no part of the port operational area9
is used for inspection. The inspection scenario includes container10
transfer from ship to transportation device with the inspection11
unit mounted on it. The inspection is performed during actual12
container movement to the container location. A neutron gen-13
erator without associated alpha particle detection is used. This14
allows the use of higher neutron intensities (5× 109 − 1010 n/s15
in 4π). The inspected container is stationary in the “inspection16
position” on the transportation device while the “inspection unit”17
moves along its side. The following analytical methods will be used18
simultaneously: neutron radiography, X-ray radiography, neutron19
activation analysis, (n, γ) and (n,n’γ) reactions, neutron absorp-20
tion. and scattering, X-ray backscattering. The neutron techniques21
will utilize “smart collimators” for neutrons and gamma rays, both22
emitted and detected. The inspected voxel is defined by the inter-23
section of the neutron generator and the detectors solid angles. The24
container inspection protocol is based on identification of discrep-25
ancies between the cargo manifest, elemental “fingerprint” and26
radiography profiles. In addition, the information on container27
weight is obtained during the container transport and screening28
by measuring of density of material in the container.29
Index Terms—Activation analysis, container inspection, gamma30
ray spectra, neutron absorption, neutron scattering, neutrons,31
radiography, x-ray backscattering.32
I. INTRODUCTION33
W HITHIN the framework of two EU projects34 (EURITRACK and ERITR@C) and one NATO35
project (SfP-980526), a technology of container inspection36
with a new neutron probe used as a secondary sensor has been37
developed for detailed inspection of the suspected container38
volume as determined by an X-ray system. A demonstration39
facility was constructed and mounted at the container terminal40
Brajdica, Port of Rijeka, Croatia. Some 150 containers have41
been inspected in combination with the Smith Heimann42
300 unit.43
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Following the implementation of the above mentioned 44
projects, several disadvantages and imperfections of using 45
tagged neutrons have been identified. 46
i) EURITRACK-like system requires a site area of ∼500m2 47
container terminal storage area. Loss of income to the 48
Container terminal and Port of Rijeka during the imple- 49
mentation of EURITRACK and ERITR@C projects was 50
estimated to 48,000 /year. 51
ii) No functional sensor (Smiths Heimann-Tagged neutron 52
system) communication has been established. 53
iii) The neutron beam intensity has been limited to ∼107 n/s 54
in 4π requiring irradiations of suspected area/spot/voxel 55
for 10 minutes since only a fraction of the neutron gen- 56
erator output was used with detection of associated alpha 57
particles. 58
iv) Only small percentage of port leaving containers could be 59
screened. 60
v) Questionable determination of the difficult to measure 61
nitrogen signature and subsequent construction of C-N-O 62
diagrams. 63
All mentioned disadvantages could be avoided by design, 64
construction and building of an autonomous and flexible 65
inspection system: Autonomous Ship Container Inspector 66
System (ASCIS). 67
This could be accomplished by: 68
1. The incorporation of the inspection system on the con- 69
tainer transportation devices (straddle carriers, yard gen- 70
try cranes automated guided vehicles, trailers–to be 71
decided by container terminal operator). In this way, no 72
part of the port operational area was used for inspection. 73
The inspection scenario included container transfer from 74
ship to transportation device with inspection unit mounted 75
on it, and inspection during container movement to the 76
container location (either to exit truck or terminal yard 77
position). 78
2. Use of neutron generator without associated alpha particle 79
detection. The area analyzed was determined by mount- 80
ing the neutron generator inside shielding and collimator, 81
defining a narrow fan beam of neutrons. This allows 82
the use of higher neutron intensities (5× 109 − 1010 n/s 83
in 4π). 84
3. The inspected container was stationary in the “inspec- 85
tion position” on the transportation device while the 86
“inspection unit” was moving along side with a speed of 87
12 m/min, resulting in ∼1 min inspection time, Ti, for 88
the whole container (2 TEU). The efforts were directed 89
towards reduction of Ti to as low as possible value. A 90
detached part of the “inspection unit” was mounted on the 91
gentry crane spreader to detect radionuclides and SNM 92
using fast neutron bombardment and detection of induced 93
gamma and neutron radiation. 94
0018-9499 © 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
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4. It is proposed to design, construct and build a trailer95
inspection unit using the following analytical methods96
simultaneously: neutron radiography, X-ray radiography,97
neutron activation analysis, (n, γ) and (n,n’γ) reac-98
tions, neutron absorption, neutron backscattering, X-ray99
backscattering. Neutron based techniques take advantage100
of using “smart collimators” for neutrons, both emitted101
and detected. The inspected voxel was defined by the102
intersections of the neutron generator and detector solid103
angles.104
In addition, the information on container weight was105
obtained during the container transport and foreseen screening.106
One of the essential parameter to be measured is the density107
of material in the container. Based on this measurement one108
should be able to evaluate the “average container density” and109
calculate its weight.110
II. CONCEPT AND APPROACH111
Radioactivity Measurements112
Presently, there are several commercially available radiation113
detection unit mounted on the gantry crane which can detect114
eventual presence of radioactive materials inside the transported115
container by, so called, passive measurement [1]. VeriTainer’s116
container crane mounted radiation detection and identification117
system, called the VeriSpreader, employs an advanced passive118
scanning technology (3He neutron counter and NaI(Tl) γ spec-119
trometer) and sophisticated identification algorithms to detect120
and identify gamma and neutron sources in shipping contain-121
ers as they are loaded or discharged from a container ship.122
VeriTainer’s prototype crane mounted solution (CMS) was in123
continuous operation at the Port of Oakland from April 2, 2007124
through May, 2008 (13 months). It operated without mechan-125
ical failure or loss of sensitivity over the course of more than126
47,000 container moves.127
The detached component of the proposed inspection unit128
can be used as an additional screening unit providing a neu-129
tron source which might induce radioactivity especially on130
fissile materials and SNMs (U, Th and others), see Fig. 1. A131
potential candidate for the neutron generator is the so called132
“long neutron generator”.133
The proposed system will consist of a spreader bar for the134
container crane assembly, neutron generator, γ-radiation and135
neutron detectors and a computer capable of wireless (cloud)136
communication. The system will measure and analyze gamma-137
ray counts and energy spectra as well as neutron counts from138
the detectors in real time as the containers are loaded to, or139
unloaded from, the container ships. The primary purpose is to140
detect the presence of radioactivity especially of fissile materi-141
als and SNMs (U, Th and others) and alert the user of elevated142
gamma and neutron rates.143
Inspection Unit144
We assume that only a hybrid gamma ray / neutron system145
based not only on a typical fast neutron gamma radiography146
system will offer better detection capabilities. In the design of147
Fig. 1. Proposed inspection unit to be mounted on quay crane. F1:1
Fig. 2. Schematic presentation of U-shaped inspection unit; density determina-
tion by using neutron transmission measurement.
F2:1
F2:2
Fig. 3. U-shaped inspection unit slides on rails along side the inspected
container.
F3:1
F3:2
the inspection unit we considered incorporating the following 148
analytical methods to be used simultaneously. 149
• neutron radiography, 150
• gamma ray radiography, 151
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• neutron activation analysis, (n, γ) and (n,n’γ) reactions,152
• neutron scattering and absorption.153
The last two techniques will take the advantage of using “BM154
smart collimators” for neutrons, both emitted and detected.155
There are several proposed radiography systems [2], [3]. The156
new system will be based on the AC6015XN air cargo scanner157
which has developed by CSIRO and Nuctech [4], because this158
is the most promising device. Comparison of the neutron and159
gamma-ray transmissions yields an R-value that can be used160
to discriminate between a wide range of organic and inorganic161
materials. However, although the fact that the AC6015XN is162
a triple beam device and there are 3 R-values the Australian163
scientists use only 2 R values. The third R value could offer164
extra and sometimes valuable information [5].165
Attention was focused to the selection of the X-ray sources.166
We shall investigate which combination of the X-ray beams is167
the best among the typical energies 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 or 9 MeV168
electron LINAC (linear accelerator), or some other values.169
Smaller detectors, especially for the X-ray array will offer170
better inspection capabilities (5× 5 mm CsI detectors–to be171
investigated). Also with smaller neutron detectors (e.g. 10×172
10 mm plastic detectors) we will “see” more details on the neu-173
tron radiography mode which represents a significant enhance-174
ment compared to the 20× 20 mm detectors used today.175
Regarding the neutron source, the only solution was the176
DT neutron generator because 14 MeV neutrons have relevant177
acceptable penetration capabilities. However, typical generators178
with a solid state targets have a short life times (typical 500-179
2000 hours), which makes associated alpha particle method180
inappropriate. Therefore, one should use the DT neutron gen-181
erators using a plasma source. This provides for at least 25,000182
hour of operational life.183
The inspection unit is “U” shaped construction with three184
arms: right, bottom and left.185
Left arm contains radiation units: neutron generator and186
X-ray source (6 MeV LINAC) inside shielding box, both having187
“smart collimators” in order to produce collimated beams.188
Bottom arm will contained the battery of gamma detectors189
(5′′ × 5′′ NaI or BGO, number, size and type to be determined).190
From our previous measurements [6] it is known that for the191
detection of 100 kg of explosive in iron matrix of density192
0.2 g/cm3, 54485 s were needed with a neutron beam intensity193
of 107 n/s and by using two 3× 3 NaI(Tl) gamma ray detectors194
inside a lead shielding thickness 5 cm. With the neutron beam195
intensity increased for three orders of magnitude this measuring196
time could be reduced to 54 s. By using a battery of thirteen 5”197
NaI detectors this could be reduced to some 3 s. This is only the198
rule of thumb estimate, the complete system performances will199
be assessed in the course of a future project.200
Right arm contains the neutron detector array for neutron201
radiography containing probably some 700 neutron plastic202
detectors dimensions 20× 20× 75 mm (to be determined);203
X-ray detector array of 10× 10× 50 mm CsI(Tl) detectors204
(exact size, number and type to be determined). Both arrays205
will be stationary with respect to radiation sources and mounted206
inside appropriate shielding. This arm also has a beam trans-207
mission detector equipped with a smart collimator and n-γ208
Fig. 4. Components of “U” shaped inspector: collimated radiation sources
(neutrons and X-rays), collimated gamma-ray detectors (bottom), collimated
neutron transmission detector, neutron and X-ray detector’s arrays.
F4:1
F4:2
F4:3
separation circuit. The detector is at a fixed position with 209
respect to neutron source at all times. 210
The size of the inspected voxel is defined by “smart col- 211
limators” in f ont of the detectors and neutron source. The 212
construction of collimators will be based on the MNCP cal- 213
culations and experiences of previous efforts as described in 214
ref [7], [8]. With two gamma ray batteries in the bottom arm, 215
24 positions of inspection unit would be required to cover a 40” 216
container length. If in addition 3 vertical positions are included, 217
this will result in 3× 24 = 72 scans, each lasting 3 s. It fol- 218
lows that the complete inspection can be done in 3–5 minutes. 219
It should be mentioned that this estimation is valid for the 220
detection of 100 kg of explosives (and other threat materials) 221
in an iron matrix with a density of 0.2 g/cm3 or an organic 222
matrix of density 0.1 g/cm3. Results for containers inspected 223
in the Port of Rijeka, Croatia, indicated that the average con- 224
tainer density was around 0.1 g/cm3, with organic type cargo 225
represented by 62%, metallic with 15%. It follows that for con- 226
tainers with higher density cargo, the measurement time could 227
be longer, which could be decided from the first evaluation of 228
the container average density. 229
During the project implementation, considerations were 230
made on the three variants of Inspection units: “U”, “L” and “I” 231
shaped, see Fig. 4, 8 and 9, respectively. We first start with “U” 232
shaped Inspection unit because it can be realized with the appli- 233
cations of present day knowledge. In this case the Inspection 234
unit is U-shaped so that the container can be brought inside 235
it. The inspected container was stationary in the “gantry crane 236
inspection position” while the “inspection unit” was moving 237
along side with a speed of 1-2–m/min, resulting in ∼10 min 238
inspection times for the whole container. 239
The chemical elements present in the investigated voxel were 240
determined by measuring resulting gamma spectra by the 3 241
arrays, each containing 12 bottom placed gamma detectors 242
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Fig. 5. “Inspector” mounted on the transport track.F5:1
Fig. 6. Loading the container onto truck mounted inspection unit.F6:1
Fig. 7. On the way to the yard or any other transfer point.F7:1
inside shielding and equipped with “smart collimators” for C,243
O (+ other elements) relative concentration determination.244
Other parameters of components used are:245
• Neutron beam intensity (5× 109 − 1010 n/s in 4π) colli-246
mated using “smart collimators”.247
• Neutron detector (transmission detector) collimated using248
“smart collimator”.249
• Gamma source collimated–bremstrahlung source: 6 MeV250
LINAC (to be decided).251
• Two source positions: bottom and top of the container or252
continuous up-down movement.253
• Construction of C-O-rho(density) triangle diagrams for254
material identification, shown in Fig. 11 and 12.255
Fig. 8. Components of “L” shaped inspector: collimated radiation sources
(neutrons and x-rays), collimated gamma ray detectors (bottom), collimated
neutron transmission detector, neutron and x-ray detector’s arrays.
F8:1
F8:2
F8:3
Fig. 9. Components of “I” shaped inspector: collimated radiation sources
(neutrons and x-rays), collimated gamma ray detectors, collimated neutron
transmission detector, neutron and x-ray detector’s arrays.
F9:1
F9:2
F9:3
• Sum triangle graph will be compared with individual γ- 256
detector triangle graphs in data analysis process and cross 257
checked with radiographs. 258
Until now, cargoes have been shipped based on declared con- 259
tainer weights in booking information provided by shippers. 260
Vessel storage plans and port operations are typically based on 261
these pre-declared weights which can vary significantly from 262
the actual mass of the cargo transported. The consequent risk 263
to health and safety of seafarers and port operatives is clearly 264
apparent [9]. Weighbridges located at the port gate are easy 265
to implement, but present significant challenges in establish- 266
ing the true tare weight of the vehicle and in differentiating 267
the weights of multiple container loads. Within the port, reach 268
stackers and fork-lift trucks provide a relatively low cost path 269
for indirect weight measurement to be integrated into vehicle 270
systems e.g. inferred from hydraulic pressure. However, this is 271
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Fig. 10. 100 kg of Semtex1 explosive in an iron box 40× 40× 66 cm3 in
volume (up) and 64.4 kg of paper in the same box (down).
F10:1
F10:2
likely to be of lower accuracy than direct measurement systems272
and it is questionable whether it would deliver full compli-273
ance with any genuinely robust regulation. Rubber-tired gantry274
cranes and straddle carriers provide a good opportunity for275
the implementation of direct weight measurement of individual276
containers with in the port environment but before final vessel277
loading operations. Such systems may offer a highly flexible278
solution with minimal disruption to existing port operations and279
container logistics.280
The proposed Inspection unit will support one of the key281
recommendations, for the implementation of container weight282
verification technology, that container weight should be mea-283
sured as close as possible to the point of lifting. In addition284
to enabling the verification of individual container weights, the285
proposed Inspection unit will also enable automatic estimation286
of centre of gravity; something that will be extremely useful in287
improving the safety of stacking operations.288
III. EXPERIENCE IN NEUTRON INSPECTION OF289
CONTAINERS290
There are several different approaches in the use of fast neu-291
trons for container cargo inspection. In addition to the use of292
Fig. 11. Triangle diagram for various materials inside the empty container
together with the paper and explosive semtex1a in iron matrix and paper behind
the iron shield.
F11:1
F11:2
F11:3
continuous tagged neutron beam also pulsed neutron beam is 293
used [10]. Also, the use of triangle graphs for threat material 294
detection and identification has been extensively discussed by 295
Maglich and coworkers [11]–[13]. 296
Let us present some of our experience of using C-O-ρ trian- 297
gle graphs in identification of materials hidden inside container 298
[14], [15]. The 14 MeV tagged neutron technique has been 299
used to confirm the presence of the explosive Semtex#1a within 300
the inspected container. Two 3′′ × 3′′ NaI(Tl) were put at the 301
transmission position in the cone of the tagged neutrons beam. 302
Each detector was shielded with a 5 cm thick lead brick [14]. 303
Container around the target was filled with iron boxes of density 304
0.2 g/cm3. 305
We have also illustrated that various threat materials (includ- 306
ing explosives) could be detected inside the container by mea- 307
surement of three variables, C and O concentrations and the 308
density of the investigated material [16]. Carbon and oxygen 309
were detected, but not nitrogen. It can be shown that 100 kg 310
of Semtex#1a can be detected in an iron matrix of density 311
0.2 g/cm3 by using the triangle graph like in Fig. 11. 312
The presence of an iron matrix around the target does not 313
change the position of the material inside the triangle plot. It is, 314
however, well known that an organic matrix would have a big 315
influence on the neutron beam because of attenuation as well 316
as termalization of fast neutrons. In order to demonstrate the 317
usefulness of the neutron system, it was necessary to investigate 318
if and how organic matrix changes the position of the signal of 319
target material inside the triangle diagram. 320
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Fig. 12. Triangle diagram for the transmission detectors (taken from ref. 15).F12:1
The organic cargo was simulated with wooden plates (dry321
wood has formula C22H31O12). Block made from wooden322
plates of 0.53 g/cm3 density and thickness of about 27 cm323
was put in front of the target material in the first measurement324
and close to the container wall in the second measurements.325
The total thickness of this block was about 60 cm along the326
tagged neutron beam axis, which means that the effective den-327
sity is about 0.25 g/cm3 (because of the empty space between328
the wooden plates). However, the average density along the329
container was even less, around 0.1 g/cm3.330
Some of the experimental results are shown in the triangu-331
lar diagram of Fig. 12, where the measured points are located332
in the three regions. The first region corresponds to the paper333
points. The second region corresponds to the semtex1a explo-334
sive and the third region belongs to the flour. Division is not335
rigid. Some overlap exists especially between semtex1a and336
flour. Generally, the effect of the wood plates is to lower down337
the position of the material in the diagram. It could be seen that338
the wooden plates which are far from the target (Case 2) have339
less influence on the target material position in the diagram than340
the wooden plates which are close to the target (Case 1 and Case341
3). Even in the case where some overlap between the regions342
could be expected, the identification of the paper, semtex1a and343
flour is possible provided that the error on estimating the sur-344
rounding organic matrix density is not too large. By knowing345
Fig. 13. Triangle diagram for the transmission detectors (taken from ref. [17]). F13:1
the matrix density and applying the appropriate calibration, it 346
could be determined how much the position of the target inside 347
the diagram is lowered down in comparison with the target case 348
alone. 349
Axes in the figure are defined as: 350
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where n’ is the number of counts in the tagged neutron peak, C 351
is the number of counts in the 4.44 MeV carbon peak, O is the 352
number of counts in the 6.13 MeV oxygen peak and n¯′, C¯, O¯ 353
are average values. 354
Similar measurements were done during the Eritr@ck project 355
with the EURITRACK system which was installed in the con- 356
tainer terminal Brajdica, sea port Rijeka [17]. In that case RDX 357
simulant was successfully detected, but also some drugs like 358
cocaine, heroin and marihuana by using the triangle diagram, 359
see Fig. 13. 360
IV. RADIATION SAFETY 361
One important aspect of the neutron inspection portal to 362
be clarified concerns the possible effects of irradiation on the 363
goods inside the inspected container. Particular attention must 364
be devoted to irradiation of foodstuff, but also pharmaceuticals 365
and medical devices. 366
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The possible effect on the public health of irradiation with367
ionizing radiations of transported goods is twofold. The first368
effect concerns possible modifications of the properties of the369
irradiated materials, induced by the ionizing radiation. This370
problem is particularly relevant for foodstuff, the nutritional and371
organoleptic properties of which must not be altered or modi-372
fied by any treatment. The second effect is connected to the373
possibility that the ionizing radiation might induce activation374
of nuclides of the irradiated products. This problem could be375
particularly relevant when the irradiation system makes use of376
neutrons, since it is unavoidable that some nuclei are converted377
to radioactive nuclides. This fact is particularly significant when378
the irradiated goods are foodstuff, pharmaceuticals or medical379
devices. Indeed, these particular type of goods when ingested,380
or kept in close proximity of the consumer, may deliver a dose381
to the individual [18].382
In considering possible alteration of foodstuff nutritional383
and organoleptic properties, the following is of importance.384
For what concerns irradiation of foodstuff with X-ray for385
food preservation, the Directive 1999/2/EC of the European386
Parliament and of the Council of 22 February 1999 on the387
approximation of the laws of the Member States concern-388
ing foods and food ingredients treated with ionizing radi-389
ation, constitutes the reference norm in Europe, framework390
Directive (Official Journal of the European Communities, L 66391
of 13.3.1999).392
As previously mentioned, this Directive defines its own limits393
of application and shall not apply to: foodstuffs exposed to ion-394
izing radiation generated by measuring or inspection devices,395
provided that the dose absorbed is not greater than 0.01 Gy, for396
inspection devices which utilize neutrons, and 0.5 Gy in other397
cases, at a maximum radiation energy level of 10 MeV in the398
case of X rays, 14 MeV in the case of neutrons and 5 MeV in399
other cases. Member States shall take all measures necessary400
to ensure that irradiated foodstuffs can be placed on the market401
only if they comply with the provisions of this Directive.402
Therefore, irradiation with neutron beams of 14.1 MeV403
which cause an absorbed dose of less than 0.01 Gy can be404
considered safe for preservation of nutritional and organoleptic405
properties of foodstuff. Monte Carlo calculation using a mod-406
eling of particular installations by MCNP5 transport code [19],407
allows estimating the dose absorbed by different kinds of food408
and foodstuff in typical irradiation conditions.409
V. CONCLUSION410
The efforts in the implementation of this project proposal411
will result in an autonomous container inspector system which412
will allow high percentage inspection without interrupting con-413
tainer movement in the container terminal. The inspection will414
be effective in identifying the containers trying to smuggle415
humans, animals, explosive, drugs, miss-declared hazardous416
materials and other contraband items. The inspection proce-417
dure will not require any additional container terminal space418
and will be programmed together with other container terminal419
activities.420
Container screening by novel methods should not be priv-421
ilege of biggest EU sea-ports. The deployment of proposed422
technology, especially in small and medium size sea and river 423
ports in Eastern and Southern parts of EU will protect whole 424
EU from unexpected terrorist events, reduce the illegal traffic in 425
humans, pets and animals, drugs and threat materials including 426
radioactive elements and SNM. 427
The ports on inland European waterways should not be 428
neglected in the EU port security network. If neglected, they 429
will represent an ideal entry point to the pathways through the 430
heart of EU and endanger many EU cities and large number of 431
citizens. 432
Further development of the proposed system, especially in 433
the variant “I” (see Fig. 9), when neutron/X-ray excitation 434
and backscattering are used in one-side geometry, will yield 435
to potential on-board applications. Such a need has been doc- 436
umented in several cases when intelligence sources indicated 437
the ships carrying explosives in on-board containers. Any type 438
of container examination on land is useless in this case if the 439
intention is to explode the ship when in port. 440
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